Real Interest, Money Surprises and Anticipated Inflation by John H. Makin
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
REAL INTEREST, 4ONEY SURPRISES
AND ANTICIPATED INFLATION
John H. Makin
Working Paper No. 818




The research reported here is part of the NBER'S research program
in Financial Markets and Monetary Economics and the program in
Economic Fluctuations. Any opinions expressed are those of the
author and not those of the National Bureau of Economic Research.NB1R Working Paper #818
flecember 1981
REAL INTEREST, MONEY SURPRISES ANDANTICIPATEDINFLATION
This paper investigates the hypothesis that surprise changes in the money
supply and anticipated inflation (the Mundeil—Tobin effect) are both inversely
related to the expected real interest rate. The two novel aspects of the
investigation are tests of the hypothesized impact of money surprises on real
rates while simultaneously testing the Mundell—Tobin hypothesis and estimation
employing transfer function methodology developed by Box and Jenkins (1970).
The transfer function enables the investigator to entertain the hypothesis that
residuals may not follow a simple AR—i process, as is usually assumed in correc-
tions for correlated residuals, but rather may be appropriately represented by
a more complex ARMA process. Based on quarterly data from 1959—I —1980—IV,
results obtained constitutes failure to reject either an inverse relationship
between money surprises and expected real interest or an inverse relationship
between anticipated inflation and expected real interest. These findings do
not constitute a rejection of market efficiency.
——ProfessorJohn H. Makin
Department of Economics, DK—3O
University of Washington
Seattle, Washington 981951. Introduction
The hypothesis attributed to Fisher (1930) and more recently the
innovative investigation by Fama (1975) have predisposed many econo-
mists to treat the expected real rate of interest as a constant. At
the very least, as a "real" magnitude, the expected real interest rate is
appealingly viewed as being independent of monetary phenomena.
The late 1970's and early 1980's have produced events which force
re—evaluation of the maintained hypothesis of constancy of the expected
real rate (hereafter referred to as the "real rate"). For example, from
December, 1980 to June, 1981 the expected rate of inflation fell by 165
basis points from an annual rate of 10.51 percent to an annual rate of
8.86 percent.1 Over the same period 3—month treasury bill rates continued
to remain largely between 14 and 16 percent with average yields of 15.02
percent in December, 1980 and 14.95 percent in June, 1981. Since there is
ample evidence that security markets continue fully to reflect changes in
anticipated inflation in nominal market rates, a large drop in anticipated
inflation which is not accompanied by a drop of similar magnitude in
nominal interest rates forces consideration of a possible offsetting rise
in the real rate.2
Statistical investigations regarding the possibility of movements in
the real rate have appeared with increasing frequency since publication of
Fama's (1975) provocative article.3 Nelson and Schwert (1977) argued that
Fama's test of the joint hypothesis of market efficiency and constancy of
the real rate was not sufficiently powerful and after applying more power-
ful tests concluded that the data permitted rejection of the hypothesisof
constancy of the real rate. Other investigations includingthose by2
Hess and Bicksier (1975), Carison (1977), Carbade and Wachtel (1978)
and Levi and Makin (1979) have rejected the hypothesis of constancy of
the real rate while tending to support the hypothesis that market in—
terest rates include an efficient inflationary premium.
More recently investigators have moved from merely testing the
hypothesis of constancy of the real rate to searching for an ex-
planation for the real rate movements suggested by a large body of
statistical evidence. Mishkin (1981) has investigated the relation-
ship between the real rate and anticipated inflation suggested by
Mundell (1963) and Tobin (1965). Levi and Makin (1979, 1981) and
Hartman (1981) have considered effects of inflation uncertainty on
the real rate. Dwyer (1981) has found that the real rate is inde—
pendent of predictable changes in the money supply.
This paper investigates the hypothesis that surprise changes in
the money supply are inversely related to the real interest rate while
simultaneously allowing for operation of the Mundell—Tobin effect of
anticipated inflation on the realrate The two novel aspects of
the investigation are tests of the hypothesized impact of money sur-
prises on real rates in conjunction with tests of the Mundell—Tobin
hypothesis and estimation employing transfer function methodology de-
veloped by Box and Jenkins (1970). The latter aspect of the study
is shown to produce a significant impact upon conclusions regarding
the hypothesized impact of money surprises on real rates. In parti-
cular it is shown that a useful aspect of transfer functions is the
ability to entertain the hypothesis that residuals may not lollow a3
simple AR—i process but rather may be appropriately represented by
a more complex ARNA process.
Section 2 lays out the hypothesis to be tested and discusses
tecniques employed to estimate money surprises. Section 3 presents
results of tests of constancy of the real rate and employs them to
explain recent observed behavior of nominal interest rates. Section
4 employs the results to suggest an explanation of changes over time
in the dominant source of movements in nominal interest rates. Some
concluding remarks are presented in Section 5.
2. Natural and Cyclical Components of the Real Rate
Components of the Real Rate
The hypothesis to be tested here involves decomposition of the
real rate into a long—run, underlying or "natural" component and a
short—run, "cyclical" component. The analogy with the decomposition
by Lucas (1973) of real output into a "natural" and a "cyclical" com-
ponent is obvious.
The natural portion of the real rate is determined by the marginal
productivity of capital and the marginal rate of time preference of
consumers.5 The equilibrium natural real rate equates, at the margin,
the subjective rate at which investors are willing to trade—off be—
tween current and future consumption with the rate at which the marginal
product of capital defines the objective, technological marginal rate
of transformation between current and future goods. Under the Mundell—
Tobin effect, the natural portion of the real rate can be affected4
by changes in anticipated inflation. A rise in anticipated inflation
causes a shift out of money balances and into real capital thereby
depressing the marginal product of capital and the equilibrium real
rate. This is the "Tobin Effect.'t Mundell (1963) describes a
similar phenomenon whereby a rise in anticipated inflation depresses
equilibrium real cash balances in turn elevating the steady state level
of flow saving due to the real balance effect. Equilibrium is re
stored by means of a lower real interest rate which elevates the level
of investment until it equals the higher level of saving. This effect,
operating as it does on the steady state level of saving,is not ex-
pected to be subsequently reversed in the absence of further changein
the rate of anticipated inflation.
The hypothesized impact of a money surprise on real interest
arises from an assumption of "sticky" price adjustment. Money growth
above its anticipated level results in an excess supply of moneyif
prices are sticky in the short run, assuming alsothat surprise money
growth does not immediately cause a rise in realincome sufficient
to absorb excess money supply. Until prices adjust fullyto absorb
excess money supply, the only alternative is forreal interest to fall
thereby lowering (cet. par.) nominal interest by anamount sufficient
to clear the money market.
The impact of a money surprise on the real rate ought tobe
temporary, lasting only as long as stickinessof prices prevents
adjustment to monetary equilibrium without some adjustmentof the
real rate. Its duration and existance is an empirical questionthe5
answer to which ought to shed some light on the speed of adjustment
of overall prices.
The exact formulation to be investigated here includes the
Fisher equation and a hypothesis dividing the real rate into natural





=— Y1(m__im)+e (y1 >0) (4)
where:
=nominalinterest rate at time "t."
=expectedreal interest rate (with r the "natural"
portion and r the "cyclical" portion).
(mt—tim:) =surprisemoney growth measured as the difference
between the (log) current money supply and the (log)
anticipated (as of t—l for t) money supply.6
=anticipatedinflation or the log of the price level
expected as of t for t + 1 less the log of the actual
price level: tt+l —Pt.
e =anerror term, normally distributed withnean zero.6
Substituting into (1) from (2), (3) and (4) gives an expression
for the nominal interest rate in terms of a constant term, anticipated
inflation, a money surprise and an error term:7
i =
a0+ (l) —y1(m_im)+e (5)
Equation (5) suggests that regression of nominal interest on a constant,
moneysurprise and anticipated inflation ought to:(a) provide an
estimate of the portion of the natural real rate unaffected by antici-
pated inflationthe constant term;(b) test the hypothesized negative
impact of a money surprise on the real rate by checking to see if the
coefficient on the surprise is significantly less than zero and;(c)
test the hypothesized negative impact of anticipated inflation on
real interest by checking to see if the coefficient on anticipated
inflation is significantly below unity. Examination of the impact
running from lagged values of anticipated inflation to contemporary
nominal interest ought not to indicate subsequent reversal of the
initial negative impact. Alternatively, the hypothesized, temporary
negative impact of a money surprise ought not to persist in which case
distributed lag coefficients on the money surprise term ought to sum
to zero.
The notion being advanced here that monetary shocks cause the real
rate to diverge temporarily from its long run equilibrium value is
also investigated in a meticulous study by Cornell (1981), extending
the work of Fama and Gibbons (1980). Cornell finds that monetary shocks
connected with reserve settlements on 1ednesdays cause temporary (1 day)7
movements in the (Fed funds) real rate of the sort hypothesized above
in equation (3)•8 He suggests further that a possible reason for the
failure of Fama and Gibbons to detect such effects is prompt action
by the Fed to offset such shocks. Cornell explicitly recognizes, how-
ever, that given (p. 18): "a dramatic shift to a policy of slow con-
stant growth of the monetary base.. .itmay turn out that reserve problems
which develop on Wednesday suddenly have a large and sustained impact
on the ex ante real rate." In short, while Cornell's investigation
of the impact of monetary shocks on the real rate is conceptually
similar to this investigation, his explicit finding of a one—day impact
resulting from Wednesday (lagged) reserve settlement shocks says
nothing direct about the possible impact of a 1 quarter money shock
on real rates of return on 90—day T—bills investigated here since he
appears to view shocks as essentially being offset within a day.
However, the above quotation clearly indicates a view that a shock
which spans a quarter would produce an impact on the real rate mea-
sured at quarterly intervals.
In another related study, Grossman (1981) considers the response
of interest rates on Treasury bills to weekly money supply announcements
by the Fed. With the change in the bill rate between 3:30 and 5:00 p.m.
on announcement day as the dependent variable, Grossman finds a positive
link running from money surprises (positive if money is above a consensus,
predicted level) to the change in interest rates. This positive relation-
ship reflects, in Grossman's view, "the Systems technique of operation't
whereby faster money growth results in movement toward the upper bound
and causes the public to anticipate tightening by the Fed.8
The positive sign of the relationship betweena money surprise
and the change in interest hypothesized by Grossmanis the reverse of
the relationship hypothesized by Cornell and thisstudy. In effect,
Grossman's rationale for this positive relationship isa policy reaction
function built into Fed operating proceduresduring the September, 1977
through September, 1979 sample period examined. Money growth above the
targeted level would cause the Fed to move to raise the federal funds
rate and the public would anticpate such action thereby biddingup
interest rates in anticipation of such a move. While thisresponse may
be possible over an intra—day time interval for a givenpolicy regime,
findings of Cornell and this study (reported below) suggest that, for
daily or quarterly data where an attempt is made to control for antici-
pated inflation, greater—than--anticipated money growth will temporarily
depress the real rate.
Measurement of Money Surprises
This study employs residuals from an ARMA (1,5) model ofmoney (Ml—B)
growth as money surprises.9 It would be possible to estimate money sur-
prises using alternative measures of money such as M—2 and/or using al-
ternative representations of anticipated money growth such as those
linking behavior of the money supply to targets of monetary policy as in
Barro (1977). While the range of conceivably possible measures of money
surprises is wide, experimentation with a number of conceptually different
measures in Makin (1982) produced highly correlated measures (all over
0.90) of money surprises and little impact upon results of testing the
natural rate hypothesis.9
There also arises the issue of sample data employed to estimate
the model of money supply behavior. If the form of the ARMA model changes
over time or coefficients of a given ARNA model change over time then
forecasts as of time "t"shouldonly employ data available as of time
"t." This problem, alluded to by Sheffrin (1979), also appears to be
more serious in principle than in practice (see Makin (1982)). It is
worth noting here that Khan (1981) has developed a far more tractable
alternative than Sheffrints procedure of periodic re—estimation for esti—
mation of surprises using only data which would have been available to
forecasters at the time forecasts were being made. Khan's technique of
ttsequential estimation" employs the procedure of Brown, Durbin and
Evan's (1975) to produce a series of any length of updated, coefficient
estimates for a given ARMA model which requires only one matrix in-
version to produce the initial ARMA model estimate. This procedure is
appealing and can be used for a wide range of data series from which
one desires to extract "surprises" in a logically consistent manner.
For postwar U.S. money series, however, it appears that the procedure
produces little impact on actual measures of "surprises." For the
sample period from March, 1973 to June, 1981 a series on M—2 surprises
estimated using Khan's method was regressed on a surprise series estimated
from the March, 1973 —June,1981 sample period. The result yielded
a constant term not significantly different from zero Ct—statistic =
0.97)and an estimated surprise coefficient of 0.93, only 1.21 standard
errors below unity. The two series are presented below in Chart 2 from
which the high degree of their correlation is obvious.
The overall result of careful consideration of alternative mea-
sures of postwar, U.S. money surprises, which may well not generalize
to other series, is to suggest that in—sample ARNA models serve as10
well as any. This is a useful piece of information as it suggests that
the simplest method of estimating money surprises serves as well as
any of the more complex alternatives.
3. Testing for Constancy of the Real Rate
Estimation Results: Correcting for Correlated Residuals
Results of estimating interest rate equations are presented in
Table 1. It is clear from equation (1.4) that after dealing with the
problem of properly modeling residuals, it is impossible to reject the
two hypotheses advanced in Section 2 about behavior of the real rate.
A one percent positive money surprise produces a significant negative
impact on the real interest rate estimated to be about 28 basis points
while a one percent rise in anticipated inflation depresses the real
interest rate by an estimated 25 basis points (1 —0.7460.25).
The relevant test of the hypothesized negative impact of anticipated
inflation on the real rate is whether the coefficient on is signi-
ficantly below unity. The estimated coefficient of 0.746 in equation
(1.4) lies 2.71 standard errors below unity which is significant at the
0.01 level.
The significance of employing the transfer function technique to
estimate equation (1.4) can be seen by comparing equations (1.1) through
(1.3) with (1.4). In equation (1.1) it is clear that anticipated in-
flation alone leaves highly autocorrelated residuals (DW =0.58).
Addition of the money surprise term raises the Durbin—Watson statistic
somewhat and adds to overall explanatory power but leaves anii
TABLE







(1.1) 2.53 0.756 .770.5887
(12.38) (17.23)
(1.2) 2.46 —0.424 0.777 .780.6787
(12.14) (2.21) (17.68)
(1.3) 2.39 -0.138 0.814 .43 - 86
(4.55) (1.26) (7.97)
(1.4) 2.66 -0.277 0.746 .91 88
(5.59) (2.66) (7.97)
(Sample period: 1959—I —l98O—IV;t—statistics are in parentheses).
1The money surprise is measured by residuals from an AR—i, MR—S model
of Mi—B growth estimated using quarterly data from 1959—I —1980—IV.
The chi—square test of the hypothesis that residuals are white noise
has a significance level of 0.94.
2Anticipated inflation is based on Livingston survey data on 6—month
inflationary expectations. Interpolation is employed to obtain a
quarterly series.
3Equation (3) is estimated with the Cochrane—Orcutt correction for serial
correlation (p =.725;t —9.06).
4Equation (4) is estimated as a transfer function. Residuals are modeled
by an AR—i; MA—3model(t—statistics 5.78, 5.59, significance level of
chi—square that first 24 residuals are white noise is 0.555).
unacceptably high level of indicated autocorrelation in residuals. The
usual procedure would be to correct equation (1.2) for autocorrelated
residuals. The result of employing the Cochranc—Orcutt procedure is
reported as equation (1.3). The result is a drop in overall significance12
levels leaving one to conclude from equation (1.3) that a money surprise
does not produce a statistically significant negative impact on the real
rate. However, inspection of the residuals from equation (1.2) suggests
that they are not adequately represented by an AR(1,O) model. Estimation
of a transfer function (equation (1.4)) reveals that an AR(l,3) model
is required to leave white—noise residuals. Proper modeling of resi-
duals produces a substantive impact upon the conclusion regarding the
negative impact of a positive money surprise on the real rate, to the
effect that the data do not permit rejection of the hypothesized relation-
ship. This result carries with it the implication that prices are some-
what sticky, at least for a period of up to one quarter.
It would of course be desirable to provide prior hypotheses regard-
ing implications for estimated parameter values or estimated standard
errors of mismodeling residuals. Hendry (1977) has investigated the
question and found that little in general can be said particularly where
higher order processes are involved.10 The best operational rule is
simply to model residuals in a way that leaves white noise residuals
and not to simply assume that an AR(1,O) representation is correct.
Possible Impact of Money Surprise on
Anticipated Inflation
It is worth noting that the estimated coefficient on anticipated
inflation is little affected by inclusion of a money surprise term. The
possibility exists that the level of anticipated inflation may be
positively correlated with a money surprise which, given a negative
impact of a money surprise on the real rate, would tend to bias13
downward the estimated impact of anticipated inflation on nominal in-
terest when the money surprise is omitted from the equation. Such a
possibility deserves consideration in the light of a persistent tendency
for the estimated impact of anticipated inflation upon nominal interest
to lie below the value of unity anticipated under the Fisher hypothesis.11
The fact is, however, at least for the sample under investigation here,
that the correlation coefficient between anticipated inflation andmoney
surprise is only 0.21. The overall implication is that the persistent
finding that the estimated coefficient on anticipated inflation lies
below unity may well be due to the negative impact of anticipated infla-
tion on the real rate rather than to biasedness associated with omission
of a money surprise. Failure to entertain this hypothesis has led investi-
gators to search over a wide range of alternative explanations including
measurement error on anticipated inflation, "fiscal illusion" (Tanzi
(1980)) and failure to control adequately for other events such as the
level of economic activity on inflation uncertainty which may also
affect the real rate. All of these possible effects may be valid, but
it would be useful to reconsider them in the light of a possible Mundell—
Tobin effect.12
Persistence of Money Surprise and Anticipated
Inflation Effects
If the impact of a money surprise is found not to be reversed after
a quarter or more the implication is that prices tend to be sticky
over a longer period of time. A persistent impact of anticipated infla-
tion on subsequent real rates would suggest a permanent impact upon14
the rate of capital formation under the Mundell—Tobin hypothesis.
These possibilities can easily be checked with output from the trans-
fer function estimation procedure. Cross correlations between unex-
plained changes in the dependent variable and each of the exogenous
variables enable a check on possible distributed—lag relationships.
For the money surprise, the Chi—Square test statistic for cross cor-
relations with 12 degrees of freedom is 14.3 with a p—value of 0.28.
While this result constitutes only a marginal rejection of possible
lagged relationships over 12 periods, inspection of the plot of cross
correlations reveals that all of the cross correlations lie below two
standard errors from zero. The most significant cross correlation at
lag 3 did not enter significantly when added to equation (1.4). A
hypothesis of price stickiness for periods of more than one quarter is
supported by these findings whereby the initial downward pressure on
the real rate is not subsequently reversed. Such a finding is contrary
to the views of many economists regarding the degree of price flexi-
bility and in view of the marginal rejection of a lagged relationship
between money surprises and the real rate suggested above, more investi-
gation may be called for. For now it is worth noting that the
(insignificant) lagged cross correlations between the money surprise
and the unexplained portion of the dependent variable are all positive
from quarters 1 through 3, ThIs suggested a tendency for (negative)
effects of the surprise to be erased over a somewhat irregular pattern
spanning about 9 months.
The Chi—Square test statistic for cross correlatIons with antici-
pated inflation given 12 degrees of freedom Is 8.52 which carries a15
1—va1ue of 0.744. This constitutes a highly significant rejection of a
possible lagged relationship between the real rate and anticipated in—
flation and suggest, consistently with the Mundell-Tobin hypothesis that
a rise in anticipated inflation produces a permanent negative impact
on the real rate.13
Controlling for Other Variables
In an earlier study of the effects of anticipated inflation on
nominal interest, Levi and Makin (1979, 1981) controlled for the impact
of output growth and inflation uncertainty upon the real rate, finding
both to have a negative impact. Bomberger and Frazer (1981) also found
that a Livingston measure of inflation uncertainty had a significant
negative impact oninterestrates.
More recently, Hartman (l981 has argued that the real rate ought
to be defined as the nominal rate lds theexpectedrate of inflation plus
the variance of the inflation rate. This implies a measure of inflation
variance on the right—hand side of equation (4) with a coefficient of
minus 1, Neither real growth nor inflation uncertainty entered signi-
ficantly when added to equation (1.4) either separately or together.
This result suggests that the money surprise term in equation (1.4) is
capturing the impact on the real rate of inflation uncertainty and output
growth. Larger money surprises may well elevate inflation uncertainty.
The natural rate hypothesis -suFts that money surprises raise the
level of real output but not its rate oi growth. However, price sticki-
ness within a quarter or inventory effects may cause money surprise
effects on real output growth. The price stickiness requirement is16
consistent with the finding that a money surprise is inversely related
to the real rate. Full reconciliation of results reportedhere with
earlier investigations will require further investigation hut ought to
provide additional insights into short run realeffects of monetary
disturbances.
4. Sources of Nominal Interest Rate Changes
The association of money surprises with movementsin expected real
rates of interest suggests that, controllingfor expected inflation, the
behavior of such surprises ought to give anindication of the behavior
of the unobservable, expected, real interest rate.
Inspection of Table
2 suggests that expected inflation rates rosesteadily from 1973 through
1974, fell until the end of 1976 andthen rose steadily until 1980 after
which they dropped by over 1.6 percent from
December 1980 to June 1981.
it appears, however, that i1it
of expected inflation over the
period was moderate (a standarddeviation of 1.22 percent for the 12/72 —
12/78period) and even fell lower duringthe 6/79 —6/81period to a
standard deviation of 1.05 percent. Duringthe latter period expected
inflation rates were high but fairlystable.
Charts 1 and 2 and Table 3 suggest acontrasting picture for the
level and volatility of money surprises.The mean absolute monetary
surprise which measures thelevel of pressure on U.S expectedreal
interest rose sharply after October
1979 for both Mi—B and M—2. So
too did the standard deviationof absolute money surprises.
Since U.S. nominal interest rateshave been highly volatile, since
October 1979 the implication of
Tables 2 and 3 and Charts 1 and 2 is17
TABLE2
MEANANDSTANDARDDEVIATION OF 6—MONTH CPI FORECASTS
(Livingston Survey Data at Annual Rates)
Standard Deviation

















12/80 10.51 2.58 1.05 (6/79 —6/81)
6/81 8.86 2.83
TABLE 3
ABSOLUTE MEAN ANDSTANDARDDEVIATION OFU.S.
MONETARY SURPRISES
(At Annual Percentage Rates;
Seasonally Adjusted Monthly Data)
Ml—B1 M—22
Standard Standard
TimePeriod Mean Deviation Mean Deviation
3/73— 10/78 3.34 2.38 2.61 2.19
11/78— 7/81 6.84 5.74 3.30 3.16
3/73— 9/79 3.56 2.56 2.45 2.10
10/79— 7/81 8.21 6.27 4.21 3.49
"Surprises" measured by residuals from an AR—3 model of Ml—B growth
estimated over the period from January 1965 through February 1973 and
updated monthly through July 1981. See Khan (1981).
2Sante procedure as Mi—B using AR—i model18
that volatility of expected real interest has accounted for more move-
ments of nominal interest than has volatility of expected inflation.
Some of the most intense upward pressure on real interest rates
in the United States appears to have materialized during the second
quarter of 1981. Charts 1 and 2 suggest that the reason for this is a
sequence of negative money surprises during that time. It appears that
in the wake of the very large negative arid then positive monetary sur-
prises inherent in the imposition and then removal of credit controls
during 1980, another sequence of surprises, this time positive—negative,
has materialized in the first half of 1981.
Forces operating on nominal interest rates during the first half
of 1981 can be described in terms of events affecting expected inflation
and expected real interest rates. Election of a new president and ex-
pectations of budget—balancing and/or monetary control tended to lower
expected inflation over the first six months of 1981 (see Table 2).
The brief acceleration of money above expected levels tended to depress
real interest rates during the first quarter of 1981 with the combined
effect that nominal interest rates, particularly short rates, fell during
the first quarter of 1981. However, an apparent tmini_accordfl at the end
of March 1981 between the U.S. Treasury and the Fed saw sharply in-
creased pressure to keep monetary aggregates, then above target, at
or below targeted levels. The result was a sharp deceleration of money
growth during the second quarter of 1981 which came as a surprise to
most observers (see Charts 1 and 2). Such large negative surprises
put strong upward pressure on expected real interest rates which more19
than swamped the depressing impact of lower inflationaryexpectations.
It may have been that most of the drop in inflationaryexpectations
had come during the first quarter of 1981 so that most of the second
quarter sharp rise in expected real interest rates (estimated, based
on Tables 1, 2 and 3 to be between 2 and 3 percent) was transmitted
directly to nominal rates with no offset from lower expected inflation.
5. Concluding Remarks
This paper has tested the hypotheses that money surprises and anti—
cipated inflation are both inversely related to the expected real rate
of interest. Based on quarterly data from 1959—I —1980—IV,results
obtained constitute failure to reject either hypothesis.
An examination of the behavior of money surprises before and after
institution of new operating procedures by the Federal Reserve Board
in October, 1979 indicates a sharp elevation of both the level and vola-
tility of such surprises. Based on results reported here, the increased
volatility of money surprises, during a time when the volatility of
anticipated inflation had, if anything, fallen relative to pre—October
1979, suggests that the post—October 1979 period has seen movements of
nominal interest rates due more to changes in expected real interest
rates than to changes in anticipated inflation)3 This would explain
Hodrick's observation of a change in the sign of observable comovements
of nominal interest differentials and exchange rates prevalent since
October, 1979 as well as the apparent absence of response of nominal
interest rates to a drop in inflationary expectations during the first
half of 1981.20
The primary implication for monetary policy of findings reported
here is to dispute the result of Fama and Gibbons (1980) whereby a
sudden transition to a sharply reduced rate of growth of the money
base would reduce short—term nominal rates. On the contrary, empirical
findings reported in Section 3 suggest that, unless a negative money
surprise results in an instantaneous equal percentage drop in infla-
tionary expectations, the overall result will be a rise ,atleast tem-
porarily, in the nominal rate due to a rise in the real rate. Such a
rise appears likely since no such close relationship between money sur-
prises and anticipated inflation is evident in the data examined here.
Overall, the implied conclusion for monetary policy is identical
to that reached by Cornell (1981), p. 19:
"Until further work is done, however, it would be dangerous
to accept the classical hypothesis that the ex ante real in-
























































































































































1. This figure is based on Livingston survey data for 6 month hori-
zon expectations regarding the consumer price index. The twelve
month horizon figure for CPI also indicated a drop of 165 basis
points while 6 and 12 month horizon numbers for WPI indicated
drops of 192 and 174 basis points respectively. Updated Livingston
survey data is now compiled by the Federal Reserve Bank of
Philadelphia.
2. Another event in the international sphere has raised questions
about the constancy of the real rate. Until November of 1978
it was typical to observe, in the United States at least, rising
relative nominal interest rates accompanied by depreciation of the
dollar against foreign currencies like the deutschemark and the
yen. Such comovement was readily explained in terms of a rise in
U.S. nominal rates due to higher anticipated inflation. However,
as reported in Hodrick (1981), since 1980 rising relative nominal
interest rates in the United States have tended to be associated
with dollar appreciation and conversely. A proximale explanation
for this phenomenon would be an assertion that real interest
rate movements have tended to dominate as causes of nominal rate
movements during the early 1980's. If such were true the observed
dollar appreciation which has coincided with rising nominal U.S.
interest rates could be explained by incipient capital inflows
attendant upon higher U.S. real rates which simultaneously caused
the nominal interest rate to rise.
3. Even well before the investigations discussed here Irving Fisher
himself reported, based on an investigation of market interest rates
during the 19th and late 20th centuries in London, New York, Berlin,
Calcutta and Tokyo, that "the real rate of interest in terms of
commodities is from seven to thirteen times as variable as the
market rate of interest expressed in terms of money." (Fisher
(1930), p. 415).
4. Mishkin (1981) found a significant negative impact upon the real
rate of a lagged actual (CPI) inflation rate taken as a proxy for
anticipated inflation. An ARIMA (0,1,1) inflation model with a
seasonal MA—L term also provided an expected inflation proxy with
a significant negative impact on the real rate.
5. Alamouti (1980) provides a similar description of determination
of the real rate. Determination of the real rate in this manner is
suggested directly by the full title of Fisher's (1930) classic:
The Theory of Interest as Determined by Impatience toSperid Income
and Opportunity to Invest It.
6. Since actual money growth less anticipated money growth is written
as: (mt—mt_l) —(t_lm
—mt_l)
=(mt—tim)7. Tax effects alluded to by Darby (1975) and Feldstein (1976) are
ignored for now. Mishkin (1981) finds that inclusion has little
impact on conclusions regarding non—constancy of the real rate.
8. Cornell is clearly thinking of shocks to the monetary base in the
form of a shortage or excess of bank reserves.
9. The Chi—Square test statistic for the hypothesis that the residuals
of the ARMA(1,5) model is 6.84 with 14 degrees of freedom which
implies a significance level of 0.94. The model was estimated
using quarterly data from 1959—I —l980—IV.
10.Hendry also suggests that identifying the correct order of error
autocorrelation is more important than the form (AR or MA). More
specifically had the true error process been ARNA(0,l) an ARNA (1,0)
would do reasonably well. But since the true process in equation
(1.4) was ARMA(l,3), ARMA(l,0) represents a serious misspecification.
II.A value above unity is anticipated if tax effects articulated by
Darby (1975) and Feldstein (1976) are considered. See Tanzi (1980)
for a discussion of these articles and others which investigate
the quantitative impact of changing inflationary expectations on
nominal interest. Tanzi argues that "fiscal illusion" or failure
to account for taxes may be responsible for lower than expected
coefficients when nominal interest rates are regressed on antici—
pated inflation.
12.Levi and Makin (1978, 1979, 1981) have investigated a number of
these effects in a model including a Mundell—Tobin effect. This
paper, however, adds consideration of "money surprise" effects
on the real rate.
13.The problem of inference here is complicated by the fact that the
Mundell—Tobin hypothesis hinges upon the difference of the co-
efficient on anticipated inflation from unity and not from zero.
However, both the incorporation of a change in anticipated inflation
into nominal interest and the real impact under the Mundell—
Tobin hypothesis are expected to be permanent. This generates a
prior hypothesis of persistence with no subsequent reversal which
is not contradicted by the data.
14.A similar suggestion has been advanced by Keran and Pigott (1980).REFERENCES
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